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Although nearly 1,200 years apart, the social stereotypes of women and the roles 
appropriate for those of the female sex permeated both the legal worlds of Ancient Rome and 
Colonial America. Throughout history, women have lived their lives by restrictive laws that 
govern the social and political spheres of society. In Rome, notably from the Roman imperial 
period around 30 BCE to the fall of the Roman Empire in 476 CE, notions of womanly 
weakness, both in regards to mental and physical ability, and the patria potestas led to women’s 
legal and social rights being severely limited. In Colonial American society, particularly from 
1639 CE to 1789 CE, women saw their rights restricted on the patriarchal basis of a woman’s 
“natural” role as pious homemaker. Roman and Colonial American gender law share a common 
misogyny; one rests in the patria potestas and the other in European patriarchal culture. There 
existed, between Roman antiquity and Colonial America, a similar legal and social 
discrimination on the basis of sex.  
Roman and Puritan Notions of Womanly Weakness 
 Throughout Ancient Rome, the concept of the pater familias, referring to the male head 
of the Roman household, and the patria potestas, or the power of the father over his descendants, 
dominated Roman law and society. In fact, the patria potestas held such power that Gaius’ 
Institutes, written in 161 CE, maintained that the patria potestas played a specialized role in 
Roman society, in that the power that Roman fathers had over their sons was unparalleled in 
other empires.1 Although Gaius explicitly cited power over sons, the patria potestas had sizable 
legal manifestations against women in Roman society around 450 BCE and beyond. For 
instance, this masculine power demanded that women could not act as their child’s conservator if 
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the husband preceded them in death.2 This legal reality indicates that the granting of such power 
to Roman women over their children would too much resemble the masculine power reserved for 
Roman men. Further, the Code of Justinian explicitly stated that “administering a guardianship is 
a man’s burden, and such a duty is beyond the sex of feminine weakness.”3 Additionally, up until 
the third century CE (and then only by special permission), women could not legally adopt 
children, as this would require the adopted child to be subject to the power of the adopter, with 
such power being something women were not allowed to possess.4 Clearly, Roman law 
conceived of the female sex as too mentally weak, in comparison to Roman men, in that they 
were unfit to administer guardianships, leading Roman women to face blatant gender 
discrimination in regards to their access to adopting and raising their children.  
This legal view of women as incapable of mental and physical independence from men 
was also clear in the Roman courtroom. In Ancient Rome, women were forbidden from bringing 
a case to court on behalf of someone else. For Ancient Roman jurists, it was understood that 
representing someone else in court was a responsibility reserved for men and far beyond the 
capabilities of a woman.5 Thus, by limiting a woman’s ability to act legally under claims of 
womanly weakness, the patria potestas put women at a legal and social disadvantage. Such legal 
discrimination on the basis of sex can be understood as Roman means of upholding the pater 
familias, as a woman’s success at such a task would challenge the Roman ideology behind the 
 
2 Judith Evans Grubbs. Women and the law in the Roman Empire. (New York and London: 
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pater familias. Additionally, Roman law reflected the ways in which women were perceived as 
physically weak, as well as mentally weak. During the fourth century, many laws were issued 
that required differing punishments on account of sex. For example, “Constantine called for 
distinctions in penalties for counterfeiting according not only to status but also to sex…. [and] 
Arcadius cited the ‘weakness of their sex’ as the reason for different penalties for daughters and 
sons of conspirators against the state.”6 Roman law placed a heavy focus on social status, namely 
between that of free persons and slaves, as well as between Roman citizens and foreigners. 
Keeping in mind the importance that status held in Roman society, the imposing of a similar 
punishment to violations of laws regarding sex as to laws regarding status illustrates the 
persistence and weight of gender inequality both as a result of mental and physical conceptions 
of womanly weakness.  
In early New England, from roughly 1639 CE to 1789 CE, the societal notion of domestic 
work as women’s work, or being women’s primary role, was largely revealed in the legally 
prescribed role for women within the Puritan society. Women’s roles in society, which included 
homemaking and devoting themselves to piety, can be seen at the center of the laws governing 
women’s lives, particularly during the later portion of this period. The disapproving social 
attitudes toward women’s control of property, as well as the belief that it was not appropriate for 
women to take part in local business or legal matters can be seen in various cases and laws 
during this era.7 For instance, the testimony of Abigail White, a Puritan woman, detailed a 
business interaction she had with a man and she indicated that “‘when Manning [the man] had 
 
6 Judith Evans Grubbs. Women and the law in the Roman Empire. (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2002), 52. 
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her sign the first receipt, he surprised her and she being a weak woman agreed to it.’”8 Such 
testimony brings insight not only to the social conceptions of women’s roles, but also that of the 
legal expectations of women in early New England and reflects a similar notion of womanly 
weakness from Roman law and society. 
The laws in Puritan society that governed women’s lives focused on promoting piety and 
limiting sexual misbehavior. This is exhibited in that there were two crimes for which women 
were tried more often than men: “absence from church and sexual offenses.”9 Thus, Puritan 
society’s legal emphasis on women in the realms of religion and sex seem to indicate a need to 
cater their laws and legal decisions to a “natural weakness” that was perceived in women. 
Further, an examination of the legal decisions and social impacts of both areas of Puritan 
women’s lives may reveal deeper social understandings of sex discrimination in early New 
England.  
Marriage 
In Roman marriage, manus was considered to be the marital equivalent of the patria potestas, 
in which the Roman wife was completely under her husband’s legal control. Not only does such 
a norm reflect the widespread misogyny of Roman society, but also the legal and social limits 
that marriage placed on Roman women. For instance, most of the marriage law in Ancient Rome 
enacted prohibitions of unions based on status, such as that of social status and state of freedom.  
 
8 C. Dallett Hemphill, "Women in Court: Sex-Role Differentiation in Salem, Massachusetts, 
1636 to 1683." The William and Mary Quarterly 39, no. 1 (1982): 173. 
9C. Dallett Hemphill, "Women in Court: Sex-Role Differentiation in Salem, Massachusetts, 1636 




 Roman society placed heavy emphasis on the importance of social status, and this was no 
less relevant in the case of marriage and marriage law. As a result, unions between freed persons 
and slaves or non-citizens were heavily frowned upon and, while not penalized, were not 
considered legal marriages.10 Further, while the union between a freedman and a slave woman 
was stigmatized, the union between freedwomen and slave men was both socially and financially 
considered problematic. This likely stemmed from the Roman conceptions of gender and proper 
social order, in which women were expected to remain socially inferior to their husbands.11 
Additionally, as social status was descended from the status of the mother, the offspring of such 
a union would result in freeborn children and would probably be seen, in Roman eyes, as a loss 
of slave supply. Thus, as a result of both economic and social gendered conceptions, the non-
legal unions between freedwomen and slave men were further stigmatized and considered more 
problematic than those between freedmen and slave women, reflecting a discriminatory impact 
toward Roman women, specifically those of senatorial status.  
In New England, the concept of marriage was entirely patriarchal. Entering a marriage in 
Puritan New England “meant that the husband owned his wife’s labor and controlled her 
property; he enjoyed wide discretion to punish her corporally; and he could collect damages from 
any person who injured or seduced her.”12 In many ways, women were a kind of pseudo-property 
from the moment after they said their vows. Further, being a Puritan wife meant “providing 
 
10 Judith Evans Grubbs. Women and the law in the Roman Empire. (New York and London: 
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services: household management, primary care of children, [and] sexual access to her body.”13 
These expectations placed upon early New England women reflect the duty and submission 
expected of wives under the manus of Roman law. Additionally, Puritan law and social attitudes 
toward gender in marriage utilized economic and psychological means to further the patriarchal 
system. To push Puritan women to “accept their dependence on men, many women were 
psychologically, not just materially, handcuffed to vain hopes that their husband’s behavior 
would improve.”14 Such a condition, while not explicitly caused by law, was exploited to uphold 
the social superiority of men through such social and legal expectations for women in 
seventeenth and eighteenth century New England.  
Divorce 
In later Roman divorce law, there were little grounds for women to obtain a divorce. In 
early classical Rome, there was “a very liberal divorce policy, in that women who were not 
married with manus had the right to divorce…, and eventually the same right was enjoyed by 
women married with manus.”15 However, by the Justinian period, “there were considerable 
restrictions on the right of either partner, especially the wife, to divorce unilaterally, and on the 
right to remarry someone else.”16 Legal grounds for divorce also differed on the basis of sex. 
During the fifth century, most of the acceptable reasons for divorcing one’s wife were in regard 
to poor morality and lack of virtue, while acceptable reasons for divorcing one’s husband 
 
13 Cornelia Hughes Dayton. Women Before the Bar Gender, Law, and Society in Connecticut, 
1639-1789. 3rd ed. (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 115. 
14 Cornelia Hughes Dayton. Women Before the Bar Gender, Law, and Society in Connecticut, 
1639-1789. 3rd ed. (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 137. 
15 Judith Evans Grubbs. Women and the law in the Roman Empire. (New York and London: 
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focused on history of criminal activity and violence against others.17 As a result of the limits set 
on women’s right to such divorce petitions, Roman divorce law, as well as the later mentioned 
Puritan divorce laws, reflect a fear of independent wives in treatment of women’s petitions.  
The influence of the patria potestas in divorce highlight the elevated role of the father’s 
and husband’s privileges in divorce cases. According to classical Roman law, the father had the 
right to break up his children’s marriages.18 As a result of women typically marrying at a much 
younger age than men (women typically married around 12 years old, while men married in their 
later twenties), daughters were more likely to still have a living pater familias and fall under 
their father’s control when they wed. In contrast, mothers had no such power over their 
children’s marriages.19 This lack of power, in the face of the patria potestas and pater familias, 
indicates the lack of legal and social power that women held in ancient Rome in comparison to 
their male counterparts.  
Later, as Rome transitioned to Christianity in the early fourth century, such 
discriminatory laws still largely existed as a result of Christian condemnation of divorce. For 
instance, many of the divorce laws enacted by Constantine, the first emperor to convert to 
Christianity, in early 300 CE were much harsher on women than men, with one such 331 CE law 
limiting women’s ability to send notice of a divorce or have her dowry returned unless she could 
prove her husband was homicidal.20 While much of the laws during late Roman antiquity 
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reflected the tendency of Christian doctrine to hold men and women to the same moral standard, 
divorce law remained highly discriminatory on the basis of sex in application.  
Legal grounds for divorce in Colonial America did not include physical or mental abuse. 
Reflecting the existence of limits to divorce for women in Roman law, the absence of cruelty as 
grounds for divorce reflected, in Puritan law, “an unwillingness to cede to women a significant 
measure of power in determining the limits to male authority in marriage,” as well as in greater 
patriarchal society.21 Most often, women were judged the offender of a divorce, rather than their 
male counterparts. Reflecting the Roman use of male custody to persuade women away from 
pursuing divorce, this tendency to put women at fault for divorce placed an undue burden on 
women in colonial society, as well as exacerbated the legal repercussions of women leaving 
unhealthy relationships. Thus, such discriminatory laws and customs resulted in many Puritan 
women being forced to stay in harmful and undesirable unions.  
A patriarchal attitude toward divorce also existed within the legal system of Colonial 
America. Many legal professionals, most often judges, were uncomfortable intervening in 
disputes regarding a husband’s exercise of authority, specifically in cases of abuse or cruelty.22 
This occurred often enough that a husband had to publicly confirm his unfaithfulness or abuse 
for Puritan legal authorities to believe that a woman’s story merited a divorce.23 This reluctance 
to intervene originated as a result of the extreme piousness of the Puritan society, leading New 
England authorities to resist adjudicating what they saw to be a private issue regarding how a 
 
21 Cornelia Hughes Dayton. Women Before the Bar Gender, Law, and Society in Connecticut, 
1639-1789. 3rd ed. (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 115. 
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man chose to discipline his wife, as was his God-given right. For, in the highly religious 
expectations of Puritan society, “female submission to a husband’s brutal correction could be a 
model for Christian resignation to earthly woes.”24 Still, such laws and tendencies of legal 
officials indicate to the deep rooted misogyny at the heart of early New England law. As a result 
of such a custom of restraint in hearing women’s claims in abuse disputes, “the notion that 
middle-class white men had proprietary rights to women’s bodies became more deeply 
entrenched as an unspoken assumption of gender relations and legal culture.”25 This inaction on 
the part of Puritan judges and legal officials illustrates the patriarchal means by which gender 
discrimination was upheld in Puritan New England during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  
Custody and Guardianship 
In regard to custody in the case of a divorce, the patria potestas still won out, with the 
father having primary custodial claim over his children. Roman law decided that the father was 
to be given custody of descendants born out of wedlock, as well as in the case of a divorce or any 
other means of a broken marriage.26 Such a custom seems to indicate the importance of 
patriarchal lineage in Roman society and was born out of a desire to keep father’s descendants 
close for inheritance purposes. Additionally, Roman women who sought a divorce often risked 
the possibility of never seeing her children again, and as a result, the gendered discrimination in 
the granting of custody acted as an efficient dissuasion for women who may have been 
 
24 Cornelia Hughes Dayton. Women Before the Bar Gender, Law, and Society in Connecticut, 
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considering divorce.27 Such a legal consequence on women highlights the way in which the 
Roman legal system often exploited Roman women’s inferior social status as means of gender 
discrimination in the law.  
As was tradition in Roman law, custody in the case of divorce followed the father in 
Puritan New England. In one custody case in the mid 1700’s, “the judges in effect announced 
that the eighteenth century would be an era when male property rights and men’s absolute 
common law rights to their children would be kept inviolate.”28 This inherent disadvantage 
women faced in obtaining custody illustrates not only the patriarchal means by which Puritan 
divorce law operated, but also a similarity between European patriarchy and Roman notion of 
pater familias. Further, such legal implications highlight the importance of certain paternal 
bloodlines in early New England, in contrast to those of the mother. 
Adultery, Rape, and Sexual Deviation 
Adultery in Rome was considered a woman’s crime, and thus carried consequences that 
disproportionately affected the lives of Roman women. In accordance with Roman law, a Roman 
man was required either to enact a public divorce in the case of an adulterous wife, or he would 
face charges of lenocinium, which entailed the keeping of female slaves for prostitution. In 
Roman society and law, adultery was defined as affair between married women and man who 
was not her husband. As a result, this codified adultery as a woman’s crime, leading a husband’s 
affair with a slave or prostitute to not be considered legitimate grounds for divorce or legal 
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action.29 These norms of Roman law and society “applied a double standard and always judged 
women’s sexual misbehavior more harshly than men’s.”30 For example, “under Augustus’ law, 
adultery… was subject to criminal penalties, and in late antiquity, such penalties could even 
include death.”31 Considering the preference of Roman law for a monetary or correctional 
punishment as opposed to corporal punishment, the inclusion of death as punishment should 
indicate a profound importance. Following from such a lethal double standard in the case of 
adultery, wives could not charge their husbands, as sexual intercourse with a married man was 
not legally coded as adultery.    
Another form of sexual and gender deviation which resulted in gender discrimination in 
Roman law is homosexuality. In Roman antiquity, the modern concept of homosexuality, or 
sexual same-sex relationships, did not exist. Further, Romans did not divide sexual activity into 
same sex relations being bad and different sex relationships being good.32 Rather, Romans 
considered relations between men and boys to be acceptable and relations between two adult 
men to be bad.33 This understanding, on the basis of status and age as opposed to gender, may 
indicate to a potential lack of gendered consideration in regards to Roman attitudes toward 
homosexual activity. However, such attitudes toward the role of the individual in a homosexual 
act was heavily gendered. In Ancient Rome, the act of being penetrated (or passive 
 
29 Judith Evans Grubbs. Women and the law in the Roman Empire. (New York and London: 
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30 Judith Evans Grubbs. Women and the law in the Roman Empire. (New York and London: 
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homosexuality), was considered “feminine” and condemned on account of divergence from the 
hyper-masculinity of the pater familias. As a result, engagement in passive homosexual acts was 
more strictly punished in the praetor’s edict than other forms of non-heterosexual sex acts, as 
passive homosexuality reversed the sexual roles prescribed to men (as dominant) and women (as 
submissive), challenging the notion of the pater familias.34 Known for their affinity for 
nicknames, many common names created in Ancient Rome were meant to highlight the 
effeminacy of men who engaged in passive homosexuality. Some examples include “mollis” 
(soft), “tener” (dainty), “debilis” (weak), and “morbosus” (sick).35 The use of feminine 
adjectives, most of which insinuate weakness, to describe Roman men who engage in passive 
homosexual acts indicate that within Roman society, passive homosexuality, like that of 
femininity, were regarded as inferior and undesirable. As a result, these feminine adjectives 
indicate an association between, specifically, passive homosexuality and gender discrimination 
in Roman society.  
Legal discrimination on the basis of sex was largely manifested from social 
discrimination. In later antiquity, “a man who voluntarily submitted to a homosexual act lost half 
his property and the capacity to make a will. In the Christian empire, the penalty for catamites 
was death by burning.”36 In the face of such harsh punishments for male passive homosexuality, 
very little is known about the existence of lesbianism in Ancient Rome. However, this lack of 
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evidence should not be taken to indicate that homosexual acts and relationships did not exist. 37 
Of such a lack of evidence, one might wonder what this may indicate regarding the Roman 
conception of women’s sexuality and sexual agency, or possible lack thereof.  
Roman law and social expectations revolved around conceptions of masculinity and 
domination of the feminine. With masculinity largely not a legal issue in and of itself, “the 
difficulties arose rather with the ascription of distinctive legal capacities on the basis of 
biological maleness.”38 These ascriptions can be seen in Roman attitudes toward transsexuals, 
now referred to as transgender, in addition to homosexuals. In Roman society, gender 
presentation, in addition to sexuality, was a mode in which gender discrimination manifested 
itself. For a Roman man “deliberately to imitate the behavior of the opposite sex was not merely 
unbecoming, it was self-degradation. Transvestism as such, however, was no crime; it formed 
the subject of a joke.”39 Although not considered a crime, the consideration of a male-to-female 
gender identity as nothing more than a joke indicates that some level of social gender 
discrimination existed and inhibited the lives of transgender, homosexual, and gender non-
conforming Romans.  
In Puritan New England, as in Roman law, adultery was legally defined as a sexual affair 
between married women and a man who is not her husband. Thus, such a definition provided a 
loophole for married men with unmarried women. The most unyielding limitation that Puritans 
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placed on sexual relations is that it should not interfere with religion.40 Adultery, considered a 
crime not only in the eyes of the law but also a crime against the Church, was punishable by 
death until 1672 CE, at which point the punishment was reduced to whipping and having to wear 
an A (for “adulterer”), as well as wear a halter.41 Such a punishment highlights the difference 
between Puritan and Roman preferences in punishment. In Roman law, a monetary or remedial 
punishment is preferred over corporal punishment. In contrast, Puritan law often opted for 
corporal punishments for crimes. Still, both Roman and Puritan definitions of adultery exhibit 
misogynistic attitudes and uphold a double standard that enables men to have active sex lives 
while women are denied the same sexual freedoms.  
Initially, Puritan law treated women’s claims of rape as truth. However, over time, 
women’s claims of rape were more often rejected in the courtroom as lies and falsehoods. A 
double standard, not unlike the one noted in Roman law and society, also permeated Puritan 
conceptions of rape. In Puritan law, the misbelief in women’s testimony during sexual assault 
cases only buttressed the precept that “male sexual license and assertions of entitlement to 
women’s bodies would generally be condoned, but women’s sexual behavior would continue to 
be regulated.”42 For instance, “if a woman’s response was to flirt, tarry, or quietly submit, then 
she lost her claim to being free from corrupting sin, and she was perceived to merit some 
measure of punishment, even though the more aggressive man was typically penalized more 
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severely.”43 Thus, anything less than adamant visible protest or resistance to sexual intercourse 
was deemed consensual, placing culpability of rape on the actions and inactions of Puritan 
women.  
In contrast, interracial sex required no such resistance from women to be deemed rape 
and necessitated no punishment for women. Mirroring Roman attitudes regarding status 
dynamics in sexual and matrimonial matches, Puritan attitudes toward interracial sex also 
indicate gender discrimination. During the seventeenth and eighteen centuries of Puritan 
America, “magistrates could conceive of interracial sexual relations only as coercive.”44 Thus, in 
the eyes of Early Colonial law, women inherently lacked full consent in cases of interracial sex. 
Such a conception of women’s lack of agency in regards to their sexual choices either reflects a 
misogyny which alleges that women were not intelligent enough to consent to (or refuse) 
intercourse with men of another race, or indicates a racial conception of sexual desire, in that no 
white woman would ever desire intercourse with a man of another race. Whether the answer is 
found in misogyny, racism, or both, the legal punishment for non-white males in rape cases were 
more severe than punishment for white males convicted of rape. In one such case of a non-white 
man on trial for rape, the judges authorized “a more severe whipping than that meted out to white 
fornicators,” that punishment being a severe whipping on “the naked back not exceeding 40 
stripes.”45  
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In addition to Roman attitudes, Puritan attitudes toward homosexuality and its legal 
consequences were influenced by gender. In seventeenth and eighteenth century New England, 
the concept of religiosity and Christianity dominated social expectations and attitudes, as well as 
permeated the legal system. In the eyes of the Church, homosexual acts and relationships were 
sacrilegious and considered an expression of depravity.46 With the clergy providing the lens 
through which the public viewed sodomy and other homosexual acts, Puritan laws heavily 
reflected the religious teachings on the matter. A sermon by Samuel Danforth, a Puritan minister 
in 1674, revealed such influence, in which he condemned the biblical Sodomites as “wicked,” as 
well as cited the practices of condemnation of sodomy by other societies through history: 
Sodomy, filthiness committed between parties of the same Sex: when Males with Males, 
and Females with Females work wickedness… This sin raged amongst the Sodomites, 
and to their perpetual Infamy, it is called Sodomy. Against this wickedness, no 
indignation is sufficient. The Athenians put such to death. Theodosius and Arcadius 
adjudged such to be Burnt. Amongst the Romans, it was lawful for a man to kill him that 
made such an assault upon him.47  
Further, much of Puritan law focused more heavily on punishing male same-sex acts than 
that of female same-sex acts. For instance, a Rhode Island law defined sodomy as “‘a vile 
affection, whereby men given up thereto leave the natural use of woman and burn in their lusts 
one toward another, and so men with men work that which is unseemly.’”48  Such language 
indicates not only the intensity with which Puritan leaders punished homosexuality, but also the 
gendered understanding within the Puritan world of homosexual acts. As much of Puritan law 
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punished male homosexuality by death, between individual colonies, lesbianism ranged between 
a capital crime and being unaddressed.  
Conclusion 
Discriminatory conceptions of the proper role of women in both Ancient Roman and 
Colonial American times, because of social conceptions as the pater familias and patriarchal 
notions, manifested in the existence of deep-rooted gender discrimination. Roman society, from 
30 BCE to 476 CE, utilized the notion of womanly weakness, both in regard to mental and 
physical ability, and the masculine-centered patria potestas to limit women’s legal and social 
rights. In addition, Puritan society from 1639 CE to 1789 CE restricted the rights of women at 
the behest of the Church and the patriarchal conception of a woman’s inferiority in the legal, 
economic, and social realms. As a result of their shared roots in misogynistic social norms, both 
Roman antiquity and Colonial America exhibited a similar legal discrimination on the basis of 
sex. These similar norms should aid in understanding not only historical conceptions of gender 
rights during Roman antiquity and Puritan America, but also in considering the impacts that 
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